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Abstract
In recent farm policy debates, proposals for a whole-farm revenue safety net program
have been put forward that could provide a farm-income safety net for a wide variety of
farming activities. These proposals include income-stabilization accounts and whole-
farm revenue insurance. Risk protection from income-stabilization accounts would
depend on the reserves in individual accounts and the structure of program benefits.
Experience with farm savings accounts in Canada and Australia suggests that lack of
adequate account balances and buildup of balances beyond the level required for risk
management can reduce program effectiveness. Whole-farm revenue insurance could
overcome these problems since coverage would not depend on the farmer’s ability to
build an account balance and benefits would only be realized when the farmer suffers a
drop in income. However, the complexity of factors affecting income variability raises
questions about the feasibility of a whole-farm insurance plan. 
Keywords: safety net, income variability, risk management, income-stabilization
accounts, savings, tax, revenue insurance
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Providing a “safety net” for farmers is an often-cited objective of U.S. farm
policy. Safety nets are policies intended to ensure a minimum level of
economic well-being for a group of people or to provide protection against
risks. Current U.S. farm programs form a safety net of coverage and support
to U.S. farmers through direct and countercyclical payments, crop insur-
ance, emergency and other loans, and disaster assistance. 
Many farms and farm households are not directly covered by the current
safety net. Commodity programs that provide direct income support reach
only one in four U.S. farms. Although the Federal crop insurance program
covers most of the acreage of major field crops, relatively few U.S. farms
purchase such insurance. There is no broad program of income support or
insurance for livestock. As a result, the safety net may reduce risk for some,
but not all, farmers. 
What Is the Issue?
In recent U.S. farm policy debates, several “whole-farm revenue” programs
have been proposed as a new form of safety net that would be available to
all U.S. farms. A whole-farm program is based on revenues from all farming
activities added together and is not linked to the production of particular
commodities. This report looks at the risk management potential for such
programs and the obstacles to implementing such a whole-farm revenue
approach to a farm safety net.
What Did the Study Find? 
Two prominent whole-farm programs—income-stabilization (savings)
accounts and revenue insurance—have the potential to overcome the disad-
vantages of current farm-safety-net programs because they could be applied
to a wide variety of farming situations and would not be linked to the
production of particular farm commodities. Income-stabilization accounts
encourage farmers to manage risk by making deposits to special savings
accounts in high-income years and making withdrawals, when needed, in
low-income years. The government would provide incentives, such as tax
deferrals and matching contributions. Risk protection from income-stabiliza-
tion accounts would depend on the reserves in individual accounts, and
those amounts could vary with farmers’ levels of participation and distribu-
tion or concentration of program benefits. 
While farm income-stabilization accounts could potentially extend the
safety net to more farms than current programs, proposals that require a
positive net farm income or a minimum level of farm business receipts
would greatly restrict eligibility for many farmers. In addition, many
eligible farmers would not have the cashflow capacity to fully fund their
accounts after considering living expenses, taxes, and debt service require-
ments. In some instances these farmers could shift existing assets to capture
tax or other benefits. However, since this would not increase overall savings,
it would not add to their risk management capabilities. 
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large share of income-stabilization account deposits could be concentrated
among large farms, providing a distribution of benefits similar to current
crop insurance and farm program payments. Thus, for many, income-stabi-
lization accounts may not provide sufficient protection, especially in the
early years of a program or when successive disasters deplete farmers’
funds. At the same time, depending upon the structure of the program, some
farmers might build subsidized balances beyond the levels necessary to
satisfy risk management goals. Experience with farm savings accounts in
Canada and Australia has confirmed that both the lack of adequate account
balances and the buildup of balances beyond the level required for risk
management purposes can reduce the overall effectiveness of income-stabi-
lization programs. 
Whole-farm revenue insurance has the potential to overcome those obstacles
because coverage does not depend on the farmer’s ability to build a balance
but instead is purchased with a premium. Additionally, balances do not accu-
mulate since there is no access to the risk management pool unless the
producer experiences the required loss or drop in income. Whole-farm
revenue insurance is currently available under the Federal crop insurance
program through two pilot programs, but questions remain about the feasi-
bility of making those programs the main U.S. farm safety net. One key
concern is the complexity of the factors that determine farm income and how
those factors vary from farm to farm and from year to year.
How Was the Study Conducted?
ERS researchers used special tabulations of Internal Revenue Service data to
analyze the income-stabilization potential of three prominent farm income-
stabilization account proposals. With those data and farm-management
records from various State recordkeeping associations, the authors examined
farm-level variability of income and issues that could arise in the development
of whole-farm income approaches to an economic safety net for farmers.
iv
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One of the main objectives of U.S. farm policy is the provision of a “safety
net” for farmers. In the most general sense of the term, safety nets are poli-
cies that:
 aim to ensure a minimum level of economic well-being for a group of
people or 
 provide protection against risks (Gundersen et al.).
Current farm policies, which are often commodity based, form a web of
coverage and support through programs such as direct payments, nonre-
course loans, countercyclical payments, crop insurance, emergency loans,
and disaster assistance. 
Commodity-based programs tend to direct benefits to certain segments of
the farm sector. While program commodities account for a large share of
U.S. farm output, many farms and farm households are not directly covered
by the current safety net. For instance, commodity programs that provide
direct income support reach only one in four U.S. farms (Dimitri, Effland,
and Conklin). The Federal crop insurance program, which offers subsidized
coverage on a crop-by-crop basis, has seen participation reach 75 percent to
80 percent of major field crop acres, but relatively few farms purchase crop
insurance (Dismukes and Glauber). Moreover, although pilot programs have
been initiated for several livestock enterprises, there is no general program
of income support or insurance for livestock. As a result, the safety net may
reduce risk for some farmers (Babcock and Hart, 2004), but not all. 
One purpose of providing a safety net for farmers is to reduce year-to-year
variability in farm income. Because of vagaries of weather, shifts in market
conditions, and other events beyond a farmer’s control, agricultural
commodity production and prices can vary unexpectedly. The resulting
1
Whole-Farm Approaches to a Safety Net/ EIB-15
Economic Research Service/USDA
Figure 1
Income of farm operator households is more variable than income of all U.S. households
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Income of all U.S. households
Net farm income of farm households
Off-farm income of farm households
Total farm household income
Source: USDA. Economic Research Service,1993-2003 Agricultural Resource Management Survey; U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population 
Survey for all U.S. households. 
Note: Coefficient of variation is defined as the ratio of standard deviation of income to the mean of income from year to year.changes cause instability in farm household income (Mishra, El-Osta, and
Morehart) and are the main reason that farm household incomes tend to be
more variable than the income of all U.S. households (Mishra and
Sandretto).
Farm income variability affects the economic well-being of farmers because
it can threaten the viability of the farm business and can hamper the farm
household’s ability to maintain consumption and build reserves for future
needs. Farmers use a variety of methods to reduce or manage income vari-
ability (Harwood et al.). Strategies such as purchasing crop yield and
revenue insurance, forward contracting, hedging, and participating in
commodity loan programs reduce the chances that a farm’s revenue will
drop below a certain proportion of its expected level during a growing
season. Management decisions such as renting land or custom-hiring field
operations instead of borrowing to purchase land and equipment can reduce
a farmer’s risk exposure. During years with low net income, farmers also
commonly delay the purchase of new capital equipment.
Off-farm income often provides a supplement to farm income and allows
many U.S. farm households to maintain consumption when farm income is
low. In fact, most farm households receive more than half of their income
from off-farm sources. Even farm operator households associated with
commercial farms ($250,000 or more in annual farm sales) receive about 25
percent of their income from off-farm sources (Jones et al.).
In addition to having other sources of income, many farm households have
assets that may provide a buffer against occasional drops in farm income.
Drawing on assets to offset declines in farm income may be problematic,
however. About 70 percent of the assets of the average farm household are
farm-related assets. For commercial farm households, the share of assets
that is farm-related is nearly 85 percent. The largest asset of farm house-
holds is farmland, which accounts for about three-fourths of their farm
assets. The value of farm-related assets, particularly farmland, tends to fluc-
tuate with income. In addition, other farm assets, such as equipment, are not
easily transferred to other uses (www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/ARMS).
Another reason for considering whole-farm approaches to a farm safety net
relates to trade issues. Programs providing protection based on current or
historical production of covered commodities are problematic under interna-
tional trade policy rules. They have been criticized as distorting farmers’
production decisions by interfering with market signals, providing incen-
tives to produce these commodities even when market prices indicate that
production would not be profitable. Such programs can lead to excess
production, which would depress prices.
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Management Assistance
In recent farm policy debates, several proposals for a whole-farm revenue
safety net program have been put forward. Such programs would be based
on revenues from all farming activities combined, would not be linked to the
production of particular commodities, and could offer a safety net to all
farms. Prominent among these are farm income-stabilization (savings)
accounts and whole-farm revenue insurance.
Income-Stabilization (Savings) Accounts 
Farm income-stabilization (or savings) accounts are designed to encourage
farmers to manage risk by making deposits to special accounts in high-
income years and making withdrawals, when needed, in low-income years.
The government would provide incentives, such as tax deferrals and/or
matching contributions, to encourage farmer participation and to help
farmers accumulate reserves. Thus far, the farm income-stabilization
account proposals have been put forward as supplements to other farm
programs, but none of the proposals has been enacted. Examples of
proposed farm income-stabilization account programs include:
 Farm and Ranch Risk Management (FARRM) Accounts. FARRM
accounts would allow farmers to take a Federal income tax deduction
for a deposit of up to 20 percent of eligible farm income (defined as
taxable net farm income from Schedule F, plus net capital gains from
the sale of farm assets including livestock but not land). Deposits
would be made into interest-bearing accounts and earnings would be
distributed and taxed annually. Withdrawals from principal would be
at the farmer’s discretion and taxable in the year withdrawn. Deposits
could stay in the account for up to 5 years, with new amounts added
on a first-in, first-out basis. Deposits not withdrawn after 5 years
would incur a 10-percent penalty. FARRM accounts were first pro-
posed following the passage of the 1996 Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act to encourage farmers to save a portion
of the transition payments during the relatively high-income years of
1996-97. FARRM accounts were introduced in Congress in 1998,
have been reintroduced several times, and were part of the administra-
tion’s budget proposals in 2001 and 2002. 
 Counter-Cyclical Accounts (CCAs). With CCAs, the government
would match farmer deposits to special savings accounts—up to a
limit. The producer could deposit such amounts as the producer con-
sidered appropriate, but government contributions would be limited to
2 percent of the producer’s 5-year average adjusted gross revenue and
could not exceed $5,000 for any applicable year. Funds in the
accounts would earn interest at commercial rates. A farmer would be
allowed to withdraw from the account only when his or her adjusted
gross revenue fell below 90 percent of its average over the 5 previous
3
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needed to raise current adjusted gross revenue up to 90 percent of the
5-year average gross revenue. CCAs were proposed in the initial ver-
sion of the 2002 farm bill that passed the Senate, but were dropped
from that bill by the House-Senate conference committee (Library of
Congress, H.R. 2646).
 Individual Risk Management Accounts (IRMAs). The IRMA pro-
gram would offer both tax deferrals and government matching contribu-
tions as incentives for producers to make deposits to special accounts.
Producer deposits would be deductible from pretax income; deposits and
interest would be taxable only upon withdrawal. The government would
make matching deposits of 2 percent of Schedule F gross farm income.
IRMA balances would be limited to the equivalent of 150 percent of a
producer’s annual average Schedule F gross farm income over the previ-
ous 3 years. Producers would be allowed to withdraw from their IRMA
only when income fell below 80 percent of its average over the previous
3 years. The withdrawal amount would be limited to what would be
needed to raise current income to 80 percent of the 3-year average. 
IRMAs were proposed in 1999 by the Alabama Farmers Federation
study committee. The Alabama proposal tied IRMA to Federal crop
insurance and implied that funding for IRMA would come in part
from crop insurance subsidies. Under the proposal, a producer who
deposited at least 2 percent of gross farm income in an IRMA would
receive catastrophic crop insurance (CAT) coverage at no cost, but
additional insurance purchased would not be subsidized.
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Table 1
Proposed income-stabilization accounts offer tax deferrals, matching deposits
Program Eligibility Incentives Limits on deposits Conditions on with-
drawal of funds
Farm and Ranch Positive net  Federal income Annual deposit Funds can be
Risk Management farm income tax deferred on cannot exceed withdrawn at 
Accountsa mount of 20% of net farm anytime, must be
deposit income withdrawn in 5 years
Counter-CyclicalA v e r age gross Government Up to 2% of When annual
Accounts farm income matching gross income, gross income
greater than deposits, taxm aximum falls below 90%
$50,000 or deferral on matching deposit of its 5-year
limited- earnings of $5,000 average
resource farm
Individual Risk None specified Government  Up to 2% of  When annual
Management matching gross income, gross income
Accounts deposits, tax additionalf alls below 80%
deferral deposits allowed of its 3-year





Source: ERS analysis of proposed programs.Potential Eligibility, Benefits, and Costs of
Income-Stabilization Account Proposals
Income-stabilization account proposals vary in benefits and program costs.
While all three proposals used a tax-based measure of income to determine
eligibility to make deposits to and, in some cases, make withdrawals from the
accounts, they differed in the types and levels of government incentives to
participate and in the potential benefits to farmers and costs to the government.
Eligibility to participate in the FARRM accounts program would be limited
to individual taxpayers—that is, sole proprietors, partners, and Subchapter S
shareholders—who reported positive eligible farm income. To benefit from
the tax deferral, the farmer also must owe Federal income tax in the year of
the deposit. Based on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax data for 2000, we
estimate that about 37 percent of all farmers would be eligible to deposit an
estimated $3.5 billion resulting in tax deferral costs of about $0.9 billion per
year. Some of this cost could be recovered as farmers pay taxes on FARRM
account withdrawals in subsequent years. 
To be eligible for the CCA program, a producer would either have to earn
average gross income over the previous 5 years of $50,000 or be a limited-
resource farmer. Based on 2000 IRS tax data, we estimate that about 25
percent of farm sole proprietors would be eligible and would receive an
average government matching deposit of about $2,100. Total potential
annual matching government deposits for farm sole proprietors would be
$1.2 billion. 
Partners in farm partnerships and shareholders in small business corpora-
tions (Subchapter S) also would be eligible. Average matching government
deposits would be higher for Subchapter S shareholders, since such entities
are generally larger and fewer shareholders would be excluded from the
program by the $50,000 gross farm income requirement. Potential matching
deposits for farm partners and Subchapter S shareholders would be $306
million and $56 million, respectively. Thus, the total annual potential cost
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Table 2
Estimated annual eligibility, potential deposits, and benefits vary by proposed
income-stabilization account program




Number Percent --------------------Billion dollars-----------------
FARRM Accounts 1,088,546 37 3.5 0.9 n/a
Counter-Cyclical Accounts 688,943 24 3.2 n/a 1.6
Individual Risk
Management Accounts 2,714,000 93 5.4 0.7 2.7
1Number of farmers is the number of taxpayers reporting farm income or loss.
2Farmer deposits plus Government matching deposits.
n/a = not applicable.
Source: ERS analysis of 2000 Internal Revenue Service tax data.for all participants in CCAs would be about $1.6 billion; with the govern-
ment’s matching of the farmers’ contributions, the total amount deposited in
CCAs could be in excess of $3.2 billion. 
The IRMA proposal did not contain specific eligibility requirements.
Assuming that participants would only have to have some gross farm
income, we estimate that potential matching deposits under IRMA,
according to 2000 tax data, could be as much as $2.7 billion. Since farmers
could deposit more than the 2 percent of gross income the government
would match, the total potential account balance could exceed $5.5 billion.
Although nearly all farmers would be eligible for IRMA, many of the
accounts are likely to be small and therefore would provide little risk
protection. Average potential deposits across all forms of organization
would average only about $1,000. Potential matching deposits would be
largest for Subchapter S shareholders (about $3,400) and partners in farm
partnerships (about $2,500).
Income-Stabilization Account Programs in Australia
and Canada
For several years, Australia and Canada have each operated whole-farm
income-stabilization account programs. Their experiences provide information
about likely farmer participation and program operation in the United States.
Australia has had an income-stabilization account program, the Farm
Management Deposits (FMD) program, since 1999. The incentive for
farmers to make deposits under the program is a tax deduction for deposits.
As long as the funds remain in the account for at least 12 months, taxes are
deferred until the funds are withdrawn. In this regard, the FMD program
resembles the farm savings account proposals that have been considered in
the United States, particularly FARRM accounts. 
Despite implementation of the program in a period of relatively favorable
farm income, participation has been low. By the end of 2002, only about 10
percent of dairy farms and 15 percent of all other farms were participating in
the program. Still, participating farm operators had accumulated large
balances in a relatively short period. By the end of 2002, there were nearly
A$2 billion in 39,500 FMD accounts, for an average account balance of about
A$48,000. The primary reason that farmers have been able to accumulate
such balances in a short period of time is that there is no annual deposit limit,
only a maximum total deposit cap of A$300,000. The only limit on the annual
tax deduction is that it cannot exceed the primary production income for the
year. As a result, during the record year of 2001-02, farmers deposited about
10 percent of the net value of farm production or about A$1 billion. 
Since 2002, widespread drought in Australia has sharply reduced income
and slowed the growth of deposits. By 2004, the accounts had grown to
A$2.6 billion with the number of accounts increasing by about 10 percent to
43,309. Participation in Australia’s FMD program is highest for the largest
and most profitable farms. An analysis of Australian farms found that farms
with FMD accounts were larger, had higher rates of return and more liquid
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such accounts (Martin). 
Canada has had an even longer experience with an income-stabilization
program. The Canadian Net Income Stabilization Accounts (NISA) program
began operation in 1992. This program provided generous incentives for
farmers to make deposits, including matching government contributions and
a 3-percentage-point interest rate bonus on account balances. After over a
decade of operation, over half of all Canadian farms participated in the
NISA program. Participation varied considerably, however, by the size of the
farming operation. In 2001, only about a third of farms with farm business
receipts under C$10,000 had a NISA account. Given the administrative costs to
participate, many farmers with low sales may have felt that there was little or
no net benefit from participating in NISA. Participation for farms with sales
above C$10,000 was significantly higher, at about 57 percent. 
After several years of operation, a number of farmers had accumulated little or
no NISA balances while some farmers had accumulated large balances but
chose not to withdraw funds when eligible. In 2001, for example, 113,000
NISA participants were eligible to make withdrawals totaling C$1.5 billion, but
only 49,500 of eligible producers (44 percent) withdrew a total of C$536
million (35 percent of the available funds). Further, one in eight NISA partici-
pants had chosen either not to access their accounts or accessed their accounts
only once in 6 years, although funds were available for withdrawal in every
year (Strain and Andrusiak, 2003). This suggests that the economic incentives
of the interest rate bonus and potential tax liability on withdrawn funds encour-
aged farmers to borrow or use other techniques to cover shortfalls in income
rather than draw down their NISA accounts. Beginning in 1998, NISA was
supplemented by disaster assistance programs: the Agriculture Income Disaster
Assistance (AIDA) Program in 1998 and 1999 and the Canadian Farm Income
Program (CFIP) for 2000 through 2003. These programs were designed to
cover losses beyond a 30-percent drop in income by supporting income up to
70 percent of a producer’s historical average. 
In 2004, NISA, along with CFIP, was replaced by the Canadian Agricultural
Income Stabilization (CAIS) program, which combines both income stabiliza-
tion and disaster assistance. CAIS was designed to address major shortcomings
identified with the NISA program. With CAIS, coverage is immediately avail-
able to participants and does not depend on the accumulation of an account
balance. Also, a participant does not receive a government contribution until
the participant experiences a drop in income. This avoids the situation under
NISA in which some participants continued to accumulate balances but did not
withdraw funds during low-income years. In this situation, the government
continued to make matching deposits and pay interest rate bonuses even
though the income stabilization objectives of the program were not necessarily
furthered by such outlays.
CAIS has several characteristics of a fully subsidized whole-farm income
insurance program. CAIS allows participants to shift the risk of drops in
income to an insurer, the government in this case, rather than using the accu-
mulation of funds in individual accounts. Participants establish insured
amounts of income based on recent history. Unlike insurance, participants are
not charged a risk-based premium. Instead, they make a deposit, which in the
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insured. It was recently changed to a flat fee per C$1,000 of margin insured.
Because CAIS makes immediate and ongoing protection available to all partic-
ipants, beginning farmers can access stabilization and disaster coverage in their
first year and coverage can continue in situations where a stabilization account
balance might be exhausted, such as back-to-back disasters.
Under CAIS, the amount of income to be covered is based on a producer’s
margin. The margin is defined as income minus expenses directly related to
the primary production of agricultural commodities on the farm. In partic-
ular, income is the sale of agricultural commodities and proceeds from
production (crop) insurance but excluding other government payments;
expenses are costs such as feed, fertilizer and pesticides. CAIS payments are
made when a farmer’s claim-year margin falls below his or her reference
margin, which is an Olympic average of the producer’s margin for the
previous 5 years. (An Olympic average is a 5-year average that “drops” the
highest and lowest values.)
The CAIS participant annually selects a level of protection, that is, a propor-
tion of his or her margin, and makes the appropriate deposit. Substantial
government benefits are paid if the participant experiences a decline in
income. As the producer’s loss deepens, government assistance increases.
The first 15 percent of a producer’s loss (the part between 100 percent and
85 percent of the margin) would be shared 50-50 with the government. For
the next 15 percent of loss, the government’s share is 70 percent of the drop
in margin. For the portion of the decline less than 70 percent of the refer-
ence margin, the producer would receive 80 percent from the government. 
CAIS does cover negative margins. If the producer satisfies certain criteria,
the producer is eligible to receive 60 percent of the program-year margin
decline that falls within the negative margin. However, the maximum total
government contributions that a farmer can receive under CAIS in a given
year is capped at the lesser of C$3 million, or 70 percent of the margin
decline of the program-year margin, relative to the reference margin. Any
negative portion of the program-year margin is included in the calculation of
the 70-percent cap.
Whole-Farm Revenue Insurance
Insurance, particularly crop yield and revenue insurance, is a large part of
the farm safety net in the United States (Glauber). In 2005, about 200
million acres of cropland—including 75 percent to 80 percent of the planted
acres of corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton—were insured under federally
subsidized crop insurance. The total amount of insurance coverage, or
liability, was about $44 billion in 2005, or 40 percent of U.S. farm output.
Farmers paid about $1.7 billion in insurance premiums for this coverage,
while the U.S. Government paid about $2.5 billion, 60 percent of total
premiums. Federal crop insurance coverage is available for more than 100
different crops; corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton account for about 75
percent of total insurance premiums. Federal crop insurance offers revenue-
insurance plans, an alternative to yield-insurance plans, for several major
field crops. The revenue-insurance plans, first offered in 1996, accounted for
8
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For nearly all Federal crop insurance, including revenue insurance, coverage
is on a farm-level crop-by-crop basis. Some have suggested that a modified
crop-by-crop revenue-insurance program, which would use target prices
instead of market prices to determine insurance coverage, could replace
parts of the farm safety net for major field crops (Babcock and Hart,
summer 2005). Others have suggested that whole-farm revenue insurance,
which would cover the combined income of all farm enterprises, be consid-
ered as a safety net for a wide variety of farming operations (American
Farm Bureau Federation).
Insurance, which is based on transferring and pooling individual risks, differs
from stabilization or savings accounts, which rely on the accumulation of
reserves in individual accounts. Under the Federal crop insurance program,
farmers obtain coverage by paying a portion of an insurance premium that is
based on estimates of the probability and magnitude of drops in revenue. The
Federal crop insurance program currently has two pilot programs, Adjusted
Gross Revenue (AGR) and Adjusted Gross Revenue-Lite, which operate on
whole-farm revenue-insurance principles. Although experience with these
pilot programs is limited, they provide some indications as to how a whole-
farm revenue-insurance program could be developed.
AGR and AGR-Lite participants insure against drops in adjusted gross farm
income, measured from historical filings of the Internal Revenue Service
Form 1040 (Schedule F). A producer can insure at a coverage level of 65
percent, 75 percent, or 80 percent of farm-average gross revenue over the
previous 5 years. Indemnities are paid if a producer suffers a shortfall rela-
tive to the revenue guarantee. The amount of the loss covered by the insur-
ance is the difference between actual revenue and the guarantee, multiplied
by the payment rate selected in advance. Under the pilot programs, the
payment rates are 75 percent and 90 percent. Both AGR and AGR-Lite
require a producer to submit annual farm plans so that coverage can be
adjusted to account for changes such as farm size and enterprise mix that
would result in less income.
The AGR and AGR-Lite pilot programs have limits that keep them from
being full-fledged whole-farm insurance programs. AGR and AGR-Lite are
intended to be used by producers of commodities for which commodity crop
yield and revenue insurance—such as Multiple-Peril Crop Insurance yield
coverage, Revenue Assurance, Crop Revenue Coverage, and Income Protec-
tion—are not available. AGR limits the share of farm income that can come
from animals and animal products to 35 percent and limits total insurance
liability to $6.5 million per policy. AGR-Lite does not have a restriction on
income from animal and animal products. The maximum limit on AGR-Lite
is $1 million.
The AGR and AGR-Lite pilot programs are very small compared with other
types of Federal crop insurance. About 1,000 AGR and AGR-Lite policies
have been in effect each year from 2003 to 2005, versus about 1.2 million
policies of all types of Federal crop insurance. Annual premiums for AGR
and AGR-Lite average about $12 million, versus $3.8 billion for the entire
crop insurance program.
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offered in 1999 and AGR-Lite in 2003. The AGR program underwent
substantial changes beginning with the 2001 insurance year in attempts to
make it more attractive to producers. The number of AGR policies reached
944 in 2003 but declined to 864 in 2004 and 708 in 2005. In 2005, total
premiums for AGR were $11.9 million, of which $6.5 million were
premium subsidies. The number of AGR-Lite policies reached 165 in 2005.
During 1999-2004, farmers received $56.5 million in indemnities under
AGR and AGR-Lite policies, about 140 percent of total premiums and 325
percent of the producer-paid premium amounts.
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Farm Safety Net
Whole-farm revenue insurance and farm income-stabilization accounts
could provide a safety net to a broad range of farms. Because they would
not be tied to the production of any particular commodity, such approaches
could be more favorably regarded under trade agreements. The concept is
simple—save when income is high, withdraw when income falls (in the case
of stabilization accounts) or pay a premium based on the risk to guarantee a
certain level of revenue (in the case of insurance). Still, important questions
remain about the method and effectiveness of these approaches. 
Use of Tax-Based Measure of Income
Both the major farm savings-account proposals and the whole-farm insur-
ance pilot programs use a tax-based measure of farm income. While this
measure is readily available, its use can have a significant impact on both
the potential number of eligible farmers and the measured level and vari-
ability of farm income.
For tax purposes, an individual may be considered a farmer if he or she has
either farm income or expenses related to a farming operation. Many
taxpayers who meet these criteria have low or negative farm income but file a
Schedule F Federal income tax return. Therefore, in the absence of a
minimum-income threshold, these farms would be eligible for a tax-based
farm-savings-account or insurance program. For instance, in 2000, there were
about 2.1 million sole proprietors of farms who filed a Schedule F. Nearly 60
percent reported farm business receipts less than $10,000, with an average
just over $2,700. These farmers on average reported a net farm loss of about
$600, but earned other income, primarily off-farm, of nearly $72,000.
Because the Schedule F farm income measure is tax-defined, it may deviate
substantially from an accrual measure of income or a measure of prof-
itability. Since most farmers are eligible to use the cash method of
accounting, farm income for tax purposes is generally recognized when
money is received or paid. This flexibility with regard to the timing of
income recognition, as well as other tax rules, especially those related to the
recovery of capital investments, can greatly influence the level and vari-
ability of both gross and net taxable farm income. Farmers can accelerate or
defer income or expenses to smooth income and avoid potentially higher
marginal income tax rates. This would reduce apparent farm income vari-
ability. Thus, eligibility to contribute or withdraw funds based on Federal
income tax data, especially if the eligibility criteria are based on net farm
income rather than gross receipts, may not be a good indicator of the ability
to contribute or the need to withdraw funds from an account. Despite the
potential drawbacks of using farm income tax data, the administrative
convenience is often viewed as an overriding advantage. Tax records might
also facilitate targeting of benefits based on total or off-farm income.
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A major concern with savings account programs is whether sufficient
deposits would be made to stabilize income. The analysis of deposits
presented thus far is based on potential deposits. It excludes factors that are
likely to be important in determining actual deposits. For example, family
living expenses, debt repayment, nonfarm income, returns to alternative
savings accounts or investments, and levels of risk aversion are all likely to
influence actual behavior. 
Analysis of a term debt-repayment margin is one way to evaluate whether
household net cashflow is a factor in limiting deposit ability. This approach
combines cash net farm income (excluding depreciation) and nonfarm
income, then subtracts family living expenses, income and self-employment
taxes, and scheduled debt repayments. A positive amount indicates that the
farm household generated cash in excess of living expenses, cash farm
expenses, and scheduled debt repayments. This cash would potentially be
available for deposits.
An analysis of North Dakota farms from 1998 to 2002 suggests that under
the FARRM proposal, producers would be eligible to deposit far more often
than they would be able to based on current cashflow (Swenson). For
example, farms with gross farm income between $100,000 and $250,000
were eligible 82 percent of the time, but only were able to deposit in 52
percent of the time. Moreover, they were only able to deposit the full
amount eligible under FARRM 45 percent of the time. However, if incen-
tives for making deposits—such as tax advantages, matching contributions,
or interest-rate bonuses—are strong, producers could hypothetically be
encouraged to make deposits regardless of cash availability. Such deposits
could be funded by borrowing or by shifting other assets into such accounts.
Another factor affecting the ability to build account balances is withdrawals.
Our analysis of IRS farm tax returns suggests that between 1998 and 2000,
farmers would have had the potential to build stabilization-account balances
to cover shortfalls, even after allowing for withdrawals. For instance, under
the IRMA program, farmers would have been able to accumulate as much
as $3.8 billion in deposits and matching contributions over the 3-year
period. Nearly 70 percent of all farms in the panel would have had an
account balance. However, IRMA balances would have averaged only about
$3,300. Under the FARRM account program, annual contributions would be
more variable. Nevertheless, farmers could still have accumulated an esti-
mated $2.5 billion in deposits over the 3-year period. Since the FARRM
account proposal is more narrowly targeted, only about 30 percent of all
farms would have an account balance to draw upon in a low-income year.
While some farms could build positive account balances, many that experi-
ence a drop in income sufficient to trigger a withdrawal would have no
account balance to draw upon or would have less than needed to raise income
up to 90 percent of the 3-year average. Although the short period of analysis
limits any conclusions about the building of adequate balances, some trends
are clearly evident. While significant shortfalls in individual account balances
remain, with each passing year the amount of the shortfalls (the difference
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amount in the account) consistently declined. This is true for all farm sizes,
but especially for commercial farms with gross receipts over $250,000. By
the end of 1998-2000, most farms had the potential to accumulate sufficient
balances to fill an income gap below 90 percent of their 3-year average.
This supports the view that protection from income variability under a
savings-account approach is limited in the early years but can improve as
farmers build account balances.
Ability To Generate New Savings
Would a subsidized savings-account program enhance farmers’ability to
manage risk by creating new savings? If deposits came from existing savings
or from borrowing, they would serve more for tax management, benefit maxi-
mization, or wealth development than for risk management. 
New savings—if deposited in income-stabilization accounts—must come
from reduced household consumption or from funds that would have been
invested in the farm business or off-farm investments. IRS data suggest that,
at least initially, many farmers who are eligible to contribute to a farm
savings account program would have ample resources to shift existing
savings into a new farm savings account instead of creating new savings
(Monke and Durst). Shifting is especially attractive if benefits can be
captured without restricting the availability of funds, as is the case with the
FARRM account proposal.
Saving for a rainy day is not a new concept for farmers. Nearly three out of
four farmers keep liquid assets in reserve to meet unexpected expenses
(Monke). To the extent that farmers are able to shift these assets to a farm
savings account, the effectiveness of the program will be reduced. Shifting
assets from one account to another would provide little if any additional
protection from variability in farm income. The extent to which this actually
happens is dependent upon a number of factors including the availability of
existing savings, the incentives or benefits available for depositing funds
into an account, and the accessibility of the funds actually deposited to a
farm savings account. 
While U.S. farm households on average have incomes roughly comparable to
nonfarm households, they typically have much greater levels of wealth (Mishra
et al., 2005). For 2004, average farm household wealth (defined broadly to
include the household’s current value of farm and nonfarm assets less the
current value of farm and nonfarm debt) was $747,000, compared with average
nonfarm household wealth of $448,000. The difference is mostly attributed to
the concentration of business equity held by farm households. The portfolio of
assets held by farm households is heavily weighted towards farm assets relative
to housing and other nonfarm assets. However, farm households also have
significant amounts of nonfarm assets, about $240,000 on average in 2004. Of
these assets, liquid assets represented about 16 percent of total nonfarm assets
while stocks, mutual funds, and other financial assets accounted for an addi-
tional 17 percent of nonfarm assets. Thus, on average, farmers have consider-
able capacity to fund new farm savings accounts from existing assets.
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Accurately measuring the risks that would be covered under a whole-farm
income insurance policy is essential to the transfer of risks that justifies insur-
ance. The complexity and variety of U.S. farm operations suggest that, though
farm income is a simple concept, the factors that determine income for a
particular farm are complex.
The measurement of insured income under the AGR and AGR-Lite policies
starts with a farm business’s tax records, Form 1040 Schedule F filings.
Adjustments are made so that the income data reflect production activities in
a single year and exclude income from farm product processing activities.
Adjustments are also made to account for changes in farm income that are
due to changes in farm size and or commodities produced. The adjustment
procedures and the data that are used tend to make the underwriting rules of
AGR and AGR-Lite complex. 
Expanding the AGR and AGR-Lite pilot programs to become a major farm
safety net program would require covering income risks from more farm enter-
prises, which would likely add complexity. While such complexity is necessary
for the accurate risk classification and measurement that underlies insurance
contracts, it may make it more difficult for producers and insurers to under-
stand the coverage, which could hamper participation. Given the large develop-
ment and administrative costs of whole-farm insurance policies, a whole-farm
income insurance program may be infeasible without government subsidies. 
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3Distribution of Program Benefits
While universal coverage is often identified as an advantage of farm savings
accounts and whole-farm insurance, is farm-income stabilization important
for farms where farm income is an insignificant component of total house-
hold income? For instance, for farms with less than $10,000 in farm busi-
ness receipts, variability in farm income has only a minor influence on total
household income. These farms—which represent 58 percent of all U.S.
farms—account for about 4 percent of total farm business receipts, typically
report a loss in farm income for tax purposes, and have business expenses
nearly four times their gross farm-business receipts. But because of nonfarm
income, these small farms have adjusted-gross-household income that, on
average, exceeds that for all other farm operators and also for all other U.S.
households. 
As the size of the farm increases, so does the proportion of household
income from farming. Fluctuations in farm income are responsible for more
than half the variability in farm household income for farms whose opera-
tors’ primary occupation is farming and for commercial farms. Other
sources of income are of equal or greater importance in explaining house-
hold-income variability for all other farm types. 
Comparing the distribution of benefits under savings-account proposals with
the current distribution of farm program and crop insurance payments illus-
trates the potential for such plans to supplement or replace current
programs. Based on 2000 IRS tax data, we estimate that about 90 percent of
all program payments and crop insurance indemnities are received by
primary-occupation and commercial farms. The distribution of potential
farm savings account deposits would be very similar. The distribution of
potential farm savings account program benefits, however, reflects only
potential deposits. Experience with similar savings account programs
suggests that actual deposits would be well below potential deposits, and
that large farms and primary-occupation farms are more likely than other
farms to make deposits. Higher participation by primary-occupation and
large farms would result in a larger share of benefits accruing to these
farms. 
Concentration of benefits would not necessarily be inconsistent with the
objectives of an income stabilization program. While the proposed programs
would provide income support through a tax subsidy or matching deposits,
their primary expressed purpose is to reduce the variability of income. To
accomplish this, deposits in proportion to the size of variability of annual
income would be necessary. While less than 10 percent of total benefits
would accrue to farms other than primary-occupation and large farms, a
program for stabilization of farm income for these farms would need to
consider that most of these farm households rely on nonfarm income for
essentially all of their household income.
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Income-stabilization accounts and whole-farm revenue insurance may over-
come some disadvantages of current farm-safety-net programs. They could
be applied to a wide variety of farming situations. Risk protection from
income-stabilization accounts would depend upon the reserves in individual
accounts, which could vary with the level of participation and the distribu-
tion or concentration of program benefits. Such accounts may not provide
sufficient coverage to compensate for income losses in the early years of a
program or when successive disasters deplete account balances. At the same
time, depending upon the structure of the program, some farmers may build
subsidized balances beyond the levels necessary to satisfy risk-management
goals. Farm savings accounts in Canada and Australia have shown that both
the lack of adequate account balances and the buildup of balances beyond
the level required for risk-management purposes can reduce overall program
effectiveness.
With whole-farm income or revenue insurance, coverage is not dependent
upon the farmer’s ability to build a balance but can be secured by paying a
government-subsidized fee or premium. Additionally, there is no accumula-
tion of balances since there is no access to the risk management pool unless
the producer experiences the required loss or drop in income. The Canadian
Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) program is an insurance-like
program, but it is not structured in a way that it could be delivered as a
commercial product and, depending on the breadth and depth of coverage, it
could be costly. While whole-farm revenue insurance is currently available
under the Federal AGR and AGR-Lite programs, the feasibility of making
these programs the main farm safety net is uncertain.
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The information presented in this report primarily relies upon Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) tax data. The estimates regarding contributions and
other variables for the various savings account proposals were estimated
from the Statistics of Income (SOI) Individual and Sole Proprietorship Tax
File for 2000 by IRS based on specifications provided by ERS for the
various features of the savings account proposals examined in this report. 
A panel of Internal Revenue Service farm tax returns was also used for tax
years 1998-2000. This panel was also drawn from the SOI tax file and
contains only those farms that filed a farm tax return and reported some
farm income for each of the tax years in the panel. Overall, this panel repre-
sents about 80 percent of all farm returns filed in a single year. This panel
was used to simulate contributions, withdrawals, and account balances for
the same farms over a 3-year period.
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